

COURSE GUIDEBOOK



Argumentation: The Study of Effective Reasoning

Part II

- Lecture 13: Analogy, Narrative, and Form
- Lecture 14: What Makes a Sound Argument?
- Lecture 15: Fallacies in Reasoning
- Lecture 16: Validity and Fallacies Reconsidered
- Lecture 17: Assembling a Case
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- Lecture 20: Language and Style in Argumentation
- Lecture 21: Arguments between Friends
- Lecture 22: Arguments among Experts
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Argumentation, Part II
Professor David Zarefsky

COURSE GUIDEBOOK



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Argumentation: The Study of Effective Reasoning

Part II

Professor David Zarefsky
Northwestern University



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Dr. Zarefsky has served as President of the National Communication Association (NCA), one of the nation's oldest and largest professional organizations for scholars, teachers, and practitioners in communication and performance studies. He has held a number of other leadership positions in NCA and other professional associations and is a former editor of the journal *Argumentation and Advocacy*.

A prolific writer, Dr. Zarefsky has written five books and edited three more and has an impressive list of scholarly articles and reviews to his credit. He received the 1986 NCA Winans-Wichelns Award for Distinguished Scholarship in Rhetoric and Public Address for his book *President Johnson's War on Poverty: Rhetoric and History*. He won the same award in 1991 for *Lincoln, Douglas, and Slavery: In the Crucible of Public Debate*. He is one of only three people to have received this prestigious award twice.

A nationally recognized authority on rhetoric, argumentation, and forensics, Dr. Zarefsky maintains a busy schedule as a member of external review committees for departments of communication studies or speech communication at various universities. He is a member of the national advisory board and the steering committee of the Center for Presidential Studies, established at Texas A&M University in conjunction with the George Bush Presidential Library.

At Northwestern, Dr. Zarefsky teaches undergraduate and graduate courses in the history of American public discourse, argumentation theory and practice, and rhetorical analysis and criticism. He has been elected to Northwestern University's Associated Student Government Honor Roll for Teaching on twelve occasions.

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Argumentation: The Study of Effective Reasoning

Scope:

This series of twenty-four lectures examines a common but under-studied aspect of human communication: argumentation. Far from the stereotypes of contentiousness or quarrelsomeness, argumentation is the study of reason giving by people to justify their acts or beliefs and to influence the thought or action of others. It is concerned with communication that seeks to persuade others through reasoned judgment. The course is introductory in that it does not presume prior study of argumentation. Because all of us practice argumentation, however, the course is also sophisticated in that it offers a systematic analysis, a precise vocabulary, and a philosophical foundation for what all too often is an activity conducted intuitively and unconsciously.

The first three lectures provide the necessary intellectual background. Lecture One defines argumentation and situates it among a family of terms: *rhetoric*, *logic*, and *dialectic*. Unfortunately, these terms either have acquired negative stereotypes in contemporary culture or they have fallen into disuse; therefore, it is necessary to understand them in their classical context. Each term is defined and the terms are related to one another. Lecture Two then surveys, in broad-brush fashion, how the study of argumentation has evolved from classical times to the present. Originally, argumentation was the heart and soul of rhetorical studies, and rhetoric was regarded as one of the seven basic liberal arts. During the intervening centuries, rhetoric was separated from its most intellectual elements, argumentation was taken over by philosophy, and formal logic (especially symbolic or mathematical logic) was regarded as the prototype for all reasoning. The lecture summarizes consequences of these trends and includes a discussion of several late twentieth-century efforts to refocus argumentation studies.

Because much of the contemporary revival of argumentation has emphasized its informal character and, hence, the inapplicability of formal logic as a model, Lecture Three is devoted to the differences between formal and informal reasoning. The main patterns of formal deduction—categorical, conditional, and disjunctive reasoning—are described and illustrated. The lecture identifies the limitations of formal reasoning as a prototype and explains how informal reasoning is fundamentally different.

The next four lectures, Four through Seven, discuss the basic components of a controversy, the situation in which argumentation naturally arises. Lecture Four identifies the conditions that lead people to advance claims and to give reasons for them. It also explains that argumentation, despite its seemingly adversarial character, is at root a cooperative enterprise. The arguers have common goals of resolving disagreement and agree that the best way to do so is to submit

competing claims to rigorous testing. The lecture distinguishes statements that precipitate controversies from those that do not and briefly considers how controversies begin and end.

To examine a controversy, we must have a command of the basic concepts of the situation and their relationship. Accordingly, Lecture Five is devoted to resolutions—statements that capture the basis of the controversy—and issues, the subsidiary questions that inhere in a resolution and are vital to its success. The lecture classifies resolutions and explains how different types of resolutions give rise to different issues. The common patterns of these issues are referred to as *topoi* (places). Lecture Six is devoted entirely to the key concept of *stasis*. This refers to the focal point of the argument, which is created by the confrontation of assertion and denial. The lecture explores how different choices about *stasis* affect argument, both in the legal setting in which it was originally devised and in non-legal arguments as well. Finally, Lecture Seven explores the related concepts of presumption and burden of proof. These concepts allocate responsibilities among the arguers and establish what must be done for a controversy to proceed to resolution.

After exploring the controversy as a unit of discourse, the next several lectures shift from the macro to the micro level and examine individual arguments. Lectures Eight through Thirteen are concerned with the construction of arguments and Lectures Fourteen through Sixteen have argument appraisal as their focus.

Lecture Eight begins this series by defining the basic components of an argument (a claim, evidence, and an inference linking the evidence to the claim) and describing how these components can be represented diagrammatically. It also considers the speculative question of whether diagrams capture or distort the essence of arguments. Lecture Nine is devoted to the nature of claims and evidence. It relates the earlier discussion of resolutions to other claims, and it surveys several types of evidence and tests for the adequacy of evidence. Lectures Ten through Thirteen are devoted to the inference and the warrants that license us to make an inference. Six inferential patterns are examined carefully during these four lectures—example, cause, sign, analogy, narrative, and form. In each case, the lectures explain that the inference depends on probability rather than certainty. The basic pattern of the inference is described, its uses are considered, and tests are offered that help to determine whether the inference is likely to be sound. Unlike deductive reasoning, in which the soundness of an inference is a purely formal question, in argumentation, the soundness of an inference is governed heavily by context and experience.

Because the goal in constructing arguments is to have not only some sort of reasoning structure but one that will influence critical listeners, the appraisal of arguments becomes the focus of Lectures Fourteen through Sixteen. These lectures offer three different approaches to the question “What makes an argument valid?” Lecture Fourteen introduces the concept of validity by

reference to formal argument, then considers what errors in each of the six informal inference patterns will make an argument invalid. Lecture Fifteen explores the broader meaning of *fallacy* and examines problems in argument that can arise in any of the inference patterns. These include deficiencies in clarity, deficiencies in relevance, and the problem of vacuity. Lecture Sixteen circles back on the concept of fallacy once again, by showing that supposedly fallacious inferences are sometimes valid and suggesting that validity may be more a matter of procedure than of form. In this view, valid arguments are those that enhance the purpose of resolving disagreement. Examples are offered of normative standards for arguments that follow from this position.

With Lecture Seventeen, the focus shifts back to the macro level. Having considered the workings of individual arguments, we now consider how arguments are assembled together in a case for presentation, attack, and defense. These dynamics of controversy are considered in Lectures Seventeen through Twenty. Lecture Seventeen explores the basic choices of selection and arrangement that are involved in constructing a case—a structure of arguments that is assembled to support or to oppose the resolution. Lecture Eighteen introduces the processes of attack and defense, again pointing out that despite the military metaphor, these are cooperative activities. Choices regarding the selection of arguments for attack and the development of the attack are considered in some detail. Lecture Nineteen completes the discussion of attacks, then examines the process of defending and rebuilding arguments, in which the choices available to the advocate are far fewer. Lecture Twenty is devoted entirely to the role of language in argumentation. By considering the role of definitions, figures of speech, precision, and intensity, the lecture establishes that language is integral to argument, not ornamentation that is added to language-free content.

The final group of lectures moves to an even more macro level and considers the practice of argumentation in society. Lecture Twenty-One presents the concept of argument spheres in which different expectations shape the culture of arguing. It then addresses the nature of argumentation in the personal sphere. Lecture Twenty-Two is devoted to the technical sphere, where argumentation takes place in specialized fields. The concept of *argument field* is presented and examples are drawn from the fields of law, science, management, ethics, and religion. Lecture Twenty-Three deals with the public sphere, in which matters of general interest are discussed and the public participates in its capacity as citizens. This lecture also explores the relationship between a robust public sphere and a healthy democracy.

Finally, Lecture Twenty-Four returns to the level of generality with which the series began and considers the goals served by argumentation as a process of interaction. Most significantly, it is a means of collective judgment and decision making. It also is a way of knowing and a means to the achievement of the goals of democratic life. As the conclusion notes, although it is sometimes fashionable

to demean an *argument culture* as inimical to harmony and civil peace, a culture of argumentation is something to be embraced in a world in which important decisions must be made under conditions of uncertainty.

Lecture Thirteen

Analogy, Narrative, and Form

Scope: This lecture will examine the three remaining common patterns of inference, completing the discussion of the components of an argument. Analogies are based on patterns of similarity and can be either literal or figurative. Narratives are based on the coherence of elements in a story. Although they are often disparaged by logicians, these patterns figure prominently in everyday rhetorical argument. Inferences from form involve arguments that have the appearance of formal deductive logic but in fact depend on probabilities. We will consider types, uses, and tests of each of these three patterns of inference.

Outline

- I. Inferences from analogy are based on comparisons and resemblances.
 - A. The inference is that things that are basically alike will be alike in the respect under discussion.
 - B. Literal analogies are direct comparisons of objects, events, situations, places, and so on.
 1. The items compared are in the same sphere of reality.
 2. The inference is that if they are alike in most basic respects, then they will be alike in the respect at hand.
 3. Literal analogies are used to identify parallel cases and to suggest precedents for an action or outcome.
 - C. Figurative analogies are comparisons of relationships among objects, events, situations, places, and so on, rather than comparisons of the things themselves.
 1. The items compared are in different spheres of reality.
 2. The form of a figurative analogy is: a is to b (theme) as c is to d (*phoros*).
 3. The theme consists of the terms to which the claim relates.
 4. The *phoros* contains the better-known terms.
 5. The warrant is that the relationship between the terms in the *phoros* will also characterize the relationship between the terms in the theme.
 6. Figurative analogies are used to make ideas more concrete by comparing them to those that are better known.
 - D. Analogies always require careful testing.
 1. Because resemblances are not identities, an analogy never can be certain.
 2. The test is whether the essential similarities outweigh the essential differences between the items being compared.

3. A false analogy is one that does not satisfy this test.

II. Inferences from narrative are based on the structure of stories.

- A. Stories are personalized and invite the listener to imagine himself or herself as a participant in the action.
- B. Stories have a dramatic structure, including characters, plot, conflict, and resolution.
- C. Telling the story permits predictions about what will come next or how the story will end.
- D. Testing narrative inferences involves asking a series of questions.
 1. Is the narrative coherent?
 2. Is the narrative plausible?
 3. Are characterizations consistent?
 4. Does the narrative have resonance?

III. Inferences from form rely on the structure of the argument itself.

- A. These are inferences that resemble deductions, in which the conclusion follows with certainty, but as used in ordinary argument, they are probabilistic.
- B. The dilemma appears to resemble the disjunctive syllogism.
 1. We are presented with alternatives, each of which will lead to undesirable outcomes.
 2. The seeming completeness of the options becomes the basis for the inference.
 3. The question is whether there are other alternatives, in which case the dilemma is false.
- C. The argument from hypothesis appears to resemble the conditional syllogism.
 1. This argument begins with a hypothesis and predicts what will happen if the hypothesis is true.
 2. The hypothesis is tested and observed findings are compared with hypothesized outcomes.
 3. Findings that seem to confirm the hypothesis may have come about regardless of the hypothesis; to assume otherwise is to commit the fallacy of affirming the consequent.
 4. The question is whether, in a given context, one explanation is stronger than another.
- D. The argument from probabilities appears to resemble mathematical computation.
 1. This argument assigns quantitative measures to nonquantitative subjects.
 2. It requires calculations of the significance of a good, the likelihood of our obtaining it, and our degree of confidence in both of these judgments.

3. The potential dangers are reification and a disregard for what cannot be quantified.
4. These inferences, therefore, should be subject to strict scrutiny.
5. This is true also for other kinds of argument that depend on measuring the unmeasurable, such as arguments from more and less and arguments from sacrifice.

Essential Reading:

Chaim Perelman, *The Realm of Rhetoric*, pp. 53–80, 110–125.

David Zarefsky, *Public Speaking: Strategies for Success*, pp. 161–164, 175–177.

Supplementary Reading:

Ray D. Dearin, "Perelman's Concept of 'Quasi-Logical' Argument: A Critical Examination," in J. Robert Cox and Charles Arthur Willard, eds., *Advances in Argumentation Theory and Research*, pp. 78–94.

Richard D. Rieke and Malcolm O. Sillars, *Argumentation and Critical Decision Making*, pp. 37–38, 115–116.

Questions to Consider:

1. Why are analogy and narrative particularly potent forms of rhetorical reasoning even though most logicians regard them as weak?
2. Why would formal structure give inferences from form special authority? Can the form of an argument be distinguished from its substance?—

Lecture Fourteen

What Makes a Sound Argument?

Scope: Although still focused on the individual argument, we shift our concern from the identification and analysis of arguments to their appraisal. In this and the next two lectures, the central question is "What makes a *good* argument?" Traditionally, this is seen as a matter of validity. An argument is considered valid if the claim follows from the evidence: assuming the truth of the evidence, the conclusion must be true. In formal reasoning, validity is purely a matter of structure and is completely unrelated to the content of the argument. In informal reasoning, validity means the avoidance of errors specific to the particular pattern of inference. These concepts of validity will be examined in this lecture.

Outline

- I. Appraising an argument requires that we determine whether it is valid.
 - A. Validity is a concept derived from formal logic.
 1. It is a matter of form, not content; it has nothing to do with the truth of any of the statements in the argument.
 2. An argument is valid if, when the evidence is true, the claim must be true.
 3. The necessity of this relationship allows us to say that the claim follows from the evidence.
 - B. In formal logic, an argument will be invalid if it fails to follow the rules for the particular inference pattern.
 1. A categorical syllogism, as we have seen, will be invalid if the middle term is undistributed or if either of the end terms is distributed only once. Also, no more than one premise may be negative.
 2. A conditional syllogism will be invalid if it affirms the consequent or denies the antecedent.
 3. A disjunctive syllogism will be invalid if it confuses the exclusive and nonexclusive senses of *or*.
 - C. In formal logic, the terms *invalid* and *fallacious* are essentially synonymous.
- II. Applying the concept of validity beyond formal logic is tricky.
 - A. Because the claim does not follow from the evidence with certainty, we cannot say that if the evidence is true, the claim *must* be true.
 - B. Yet informal reasoning seeks to achieve the function served by validity: a content-free check on the process of reasoning.

- C. This function is achieved by focusing on experience rather than form.
 1. A subject-matter field will generate its own ways of testing and weighing claims and evidence.
 2. A general tendency develops over time for certain reasoning patterns to produce good or bad results.
 3. The specific situations in which arguers find themselves may also provide standards of reasoning.
- III. For informal reasoning, there are also standards for each pattern of inference, but they are matters of experience rather than form.
 - A. For inferences from example, valid arguments are those that avoid key pitfalls.
 1. They will avoid hasty generalization.
 2. They will avoid the fallacy of composition.
 3. They will avoid the fallacy of division.
 - B. For inferences from cause, valid arguments will avoid several errors.
 1. They will avoid confusing sign and cause.
 2. They will avoid failing to identify a common cause.
 3. They will avoid confusing temporality with causality.
 4. They will not ignore multiple causes or multiple effects.
 5. They will not ignore intervening or counteracting causes.
 - C. For inferences from sign, valid arguments meet specific tests.
 1. The sign and the thing signified generally occur together.
 2. The sign does not appear by itself, without the thing signified.
 3. There are not obvious countersigns.
 4. The same sign doesn't herald opposite things.
 5. The relationship is not mere coincidence.
 6. Sign is not confused with cause.
 - D. For inferences from analogy, valid arguments are those in which essential similarities are greater than essential differences.
 - E. For inferences from narrative, there are four key tests for valid arguments.
 1. The narrative is coherent.
 2. The narrative is plausible.
 3. Characterizations are consistent.
 4. The narrative has resonance.
 - F. For inferences from authority, there are three key tests for valid arguments.
 1. The authority is within his or her area of expertise.
 2. The authority has a basis for judgment.
 3. The authority is not contradicted by most other experts.

- G. For inferences from form, valid arguments are those that recognize the difference between the appearance of deductive form and the probability (rather than the certainty) that the claim is correct.
- H. Each of these standards represents a test that can be used to determine the validity of an argument.
- I. In informal logic, validity is not content free.

Essential Reading:

Frans H. van Eemeren et al., *Fundamentals of Argumentation Theory*, chapter 8.
 Robert J. Fogelin and Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, *Understanding Arguments*, pp. 3–47.

Supplementary Reading:

Ray E. McKerrow, "Rhetorical Validity: An Analysis of Three Perspectives on the Justification of Rhetorical Argument," in William L. Benoit, Dale Hamble, and Pamela J. Benoit, eds., *Readings in Argumentation*, pp. 297–311.

Questions to Consider:

1. How can judgments of an argument's validity be separated from judgments about the truth of its claims?
2. What are the similarities and differences between concepts of validity in formal and informal reasoning?

Lecture Fifteen

Fallacies in Reasoning

Scope: Although the term often is used more loosely, *fallacy* means a deficiency in the form of an argument that is not immediately apparent. A second approach to appraising arguments is to examine them for possible fallacies. In traditional logic, fallacies are particular to specific patterns of inference. In informal argument, deficiencies in form are at least partly dependent on context. In addition to problems with particular inference patterns, some fallacies are more general. These more general problems in reasoning are the focus of this lecture. Although fallacies can be classified in different ways, we group them as deficiencies in clarity, deficiencies in relevance, and vacuity ("empty" arguments). We will explore how each of these misuses of reasoning can cause an argument to go astray.

Outline

- I. In everyday argument, *fallacy* has a broader meaning than in formal argument.
 - A. In common usage, *fallacy* often is used to mean anything that is wrong with an argument.
 - B. More precisely, *fallacy* is a deficiency in the form of an argument that is not immediately apparent.
 - C. In informal reasoning, though, deficiencies in form are dependent on context.
 1. They include deficiencies in specific reasoning patterns, discussed in the last lecture.
 2. They also include more general errors in reasoning and language.
 3. These may be classified in different ways, but labeling is less important than recognizing the deficiency.
- II. Some fallacies are deficiencies in clarity.
 - A. These result from the inexactness of language, a condition peculiar to informal argument.
 - B. Equivocation is the use of the same word to convey different meanings in the same argument.
 - C. Ambiguity results when we cannot be sure which of a set of possible meanings is the intended meaning.
 - D. Vagueness is a situation in which a term or concept is indeterminate.
 - E. Heaps and slippery slopes are patterns in which boundaries or dividing lines, being imprecise, are treated as if they were nonexistent.

III. Some fallacies are deficiencies in relevance.

- A. These result from introducing a factor that has nothing to do with the relationship between the evidence and the claim.
- B. *Ad hominem* arguments are usually defined as those in which an attack on a person is substituted for a response to an argument. (This definition will be modified in the next lecture.)
- C. Appeals to authority may be fallacies if they substitute for argument or if the authority is outside the area of his or her expertise or has no basis for reaching conclusions.
- D. Appeals to popularity ("bandwagon effect") substitute the fact that others support an idea for an argument in its behalf.
- E. Appeals to tradition can be used to block consideration of change without engaging the argument.
- F. Appeals to ignorance assume that a claim must be true (or false) because the opposite position cannot be proved (or disproved).
- G. Appeals to inappropriate emotion prevent argument through expressions of anger, fear, or other emotions impervious to argument.
- H. Although these patterns are discussed as fallacies, circumstances exist in which each of them may be a reasonable and appropriate argument.

IV. Some fallacies are the result of vacuity.

- A. These result from failure to provide necessary proofs, leaving "holes" or empty spaces in the argument.
- B. Circular reasoning occurs when the evidence either restates the conclusion or logically presupposes the conclusion.
- C. Begging the question occurs when a claim is made dependent on other claims that are implicitly assumed but are not established in the argument.
- D. Ignoring the question is the result of a digression or a focus on matter extraneous to the situation at hand; the irrelevant material that is introduced is sometimes called a "red herring."
- E. A *non sequitur* is an argument in which, on the face of it, no connection exists between the claim and the evidence.
- F. A "straw man" has been attacked when one's argument responds to a claim that has not been made and that is not in dispute, rather than to the claim that really is the focus of the dispute.
- G. A self-sealing argument is one that does not admit of any possible testing or falsification because it can encompass seemingly opposite results.

Essential Reading:

"Fallacies," in Thomas Sloane, ed., *Encyclopedia of Rhetoric*, pp. 295–301.

Austin J. Freeley and David L. Steinberg, *Argumentation and Debate*, chapter 10.

Supplementary Reading:

Frans H. van Eemeren et al., *Fundamentals of Argumentation Theory*, pp. 62–74.

Richard D. Rieke and Malcolm O. Sillars, *Argumentation and Critical Decision Making*, pp. 249–265.

Questions to Consider:

- 1. Why are the fallacies discussed in this lecture not *always* deficiencies in argument? How can they be dependent on context and still be fallacies?
- 2. If one were to encounter an argument containing any of the fallacies discussed in this lecture, what would be necessary to purge the argument of its fallacious character and, thereby, reclaim the argument?

Lecture Sixteen

Validity and Fallacies Reconsidered

Scope: This lecture completes our treatment of argument appraisal by examining some contemporary approaches to the problem. This lecture will complicate the idea of fallacies. Whether arguments are valid or not may depend, not on logical standards or inflexible criteria, but on the participants' intentions and on whether the controversy adheres to rules of dialogue that sustain productive arguments. This lecture will use the example of the *ad hominem* argument to illustrate a problem with the idea of fallacies. Then an example of procedural standards of validity will be discussed, drawing on the pragma-dialectical theory of Frans van Eemeren and Rob Grootendorst.

Outline

- I. Further study of the *ad hominem* argument illustrates difficulties with the conventional approach to fallacies.
 - A. *Ad hominem* is conventionally understood as an argument against the person and is seen as a fallacy because it substitutes personal attack for the substance of the dispute.
 - B. In fact, several different types of argument are grouped under the name *ad hominem*.
 1. The *bad character* type asserts that the person is an untrustworthy source for the claim.
 2. The *circumstantial* type asserts that the person's own conduct or other beliefs and commitments are at odds with the claim he or she asserts.
 3. The *bias* type asserts that the person has some prejudice or vested interest that prevents him or her from being an impartial source.
 - C. Each of these types might be a perfectly appropriate argument, depending on the circumstances.
 1. If a claim depends on the good judgment of the source, questioning trustworthiness is highly relevant.
 2. If one's sincerity is doubted or if one maintains a position inconsistently, the confidence that another person gives to that position will—and should—be reduced.
 3. Although epithets are usually undesirable, establishing the bias of a source may discredit an inference based on the source's testimony.
 - D. What we have seen about *ad hominem* holds true for most of the informal fallacies: They may be valid arguments or they may be fallacies, depending on the situation.
- II. To reduce these difficulties, another approach to appraising arguments focuses not on their structure but on their function.
 - A. Arguments occur in discourse in which the goal is to resolve disagreement (although this does not necessarily mean settling all disputes).
 - B. The arguments should be appraised in the context of that disagreement.
 1. The specific commitments of the participants should be considered.
 2. Conversational implications that are not strictly logical (such as rhetorical questions) should be considered.
 - C. Under this approach, a fallacious argument is one that undermines efforts to resolve disagreement; it is a procedural, rather than a formal, violation.
- III. Principles for effective resolution can be identified so that violations of the principles can be deemed fallacious.
 - A. Examples of the principles developed by contemporary Dutch scholars van Eemeren and Grootendorst suggest the nature of these rules.
 1. A party who advances a standpoint is obliged to defend it if asked by the other party to do so.
 2. A party's attack on a standpoint must relate to the standpoint that has indeed been advanced by the other party.
 3. A party may not falsely present a premise as an accepted starting point nor deny a premise representing an accepted starting point.
 4. A failed defense of a standpoint must result in the party that put forward the standpoint retracting it and a conclusive defense of the standpoint must result in the other party retracting its doubt about the standpoint.
 5. A party must not use formulations that are insufficiently clear or confusingly ambiguous and a party must interpret the other party's formulations as carefully and accurately as possible.
 - B. In the absence of such specific rules, the question to ask of any argument is whether it fulfills the purpose of resolving disagreement.
 - C. From these principles, it is possible to identify examples of fallacious arguments.
 1. Declaring a standpoint sacrosanct removes the necessity to defend it.
 2. Putting pressure on the opponent may stifle an objection that would require that a defense be presented.
 3. Introducing irrelevant matters causes the discussion to lose focus on the standpoint being considered.
 4. Falsely presenting a premise as self-evident makes it appear noncontroversial and, hence, not open to challenge.
 5. Exploiting prejudice of the opponent diverts the discussion from the standpoint at issue.

6. Using language to obfuscate violates the rule to be clear.
7. In general, an argument is fallacious not because of its inherent structure but because it violates one or more of these procedural rules.

IV. Arguments are appraised both by impartial analysts and by the arguers themselves.

- A. An impartial analyst can reconstruct the dispute and examine arguments in relation to the principles of critical discussion.
- B. The arguers can adopt conventions that will increase the likelihood of satisfying the rules.
 1. One such convention is to imagine that one is addressing a universal audience, composed of all reasonable people, and, hence, not to exploit the specific commitments or prejudices of a particular person.
 2. Another convention is to imagine that one seeks a consensus that one's opponent would recognize as warranted.
 3. In this view, valid arguments are those that, in the specific situation, one is obligated to accept.

Essential Reading:

Douglas Walton, *A Pragmatic Analysis of Fallacy*, chapters 1 and 8.

Frans H. van Eemeren et al., *Fundamentals of Argumentation Theory*, chapter 10.

Supplementary Reading:

"Ad Hominem Arguments," in Thomas Sloane, ed., *Encyclopedia of Rhetoric*, pp. 1-4.

Ralph H. Johnson, *Manifest Rationality*, chapter 6.

Questions to Consider:

1. Must arguers share the same purpose? If not, how can one determine whether specific arguments violate procedural standards?
2. How can one determine, before using an *ad hominem* argument, whether it will be determined valid or fallacious in the particular situation?

Lecture Seventeen

Assembling a Case

Scope: Having explored the analysis and appraisal of arguments at the micro level, we return to macro level considerations. The next four lectures consider how arguments are joined together to form a case and how the case can be attacked and defended. The case is a structure of claims and evidence selected to support or oppose the resolution for a specific audience. Case construction involves choices of which arguments to use and how to arrange them. In individual arguments, choices are made of which evidence to use and how to arrange it. This lecture will identify the key choices and the factors that go into making them.

Outline

- I. A case is the structure of subsidiary claims and evidence selected for supporting or opposing a resolution for a specific audience.
 - A. Constructing a case involves choices from a broader range of proofs that are potentially available.
 1. Choices are made regarding which arguments to use.
 2. In arguments, choices are made regarding which evidence to use.
 3. Choices are made regarding how to arrange arguments and, in arguments, how to arrange evidence.
 - B. Choices are audience specific.
 1. They adapt to a particular audience the appeals that were formed with a universal audience in mind.
 2. They combine creativity with constraint.
- II. Regarding the selection of arguments, the key considerations are whether the arguments are strong enough and how many to include.
 - A. Strength is a function of two main factors.
 1. It is a function of the listener's prior adherence to the evidence or the likelihood that adherence can be obtained.
 2. It is a function of the relevance of the claim to the resolution.
 3. Each of these factors is affected by other variables, such as the degree of probability, the timeframe of the argument, and the argument's consistency with common sense.
 - B. Determining the amplitude (number and range of arguments) is affected by more factors than just the amount of time available.
 1. Amplitude can be increased to offset the inconclusiveness of individual arguments or to hedge against the heterogeneity of the audience.

2. Increasing amplitude has risks, however: A poor argument reflects badly on all choices and on the arguer's credibility, and piling up arguments may seem overly defensive.
3. With appropriate care in framing arguments, some of the dangers of increasing amplitude can be minimized.

C. The arguments selected for the case should meet several tests.

1. They should be simply stated.
2. They should be discrete.
3. They should be balanced among aspects of the subject that call for presentation.
4. They should be coherent.
5. They should be complete, speaking to all the key issues.


III. Similar considerations affect the selection of evidence in individual arguments.

- A. Strength of the evidence is determined by applying the tests discussed in Lecture Nine.
- B. The amount of evidence needed will depend on the audience's predisposition to accept the claim and the relevance of the evidence to the claim.
- C. Evidence selected for the argument should meet several tests.
 1. It should be relatively easy to understand.
 2. It should be interesting and vivid.
 3. It should be consistent with other things listeners know and believe.
 4. When possible, it should be efficient to present.

IV. Basically the same choices regarding arrangement are made for the case as a whole and for individual arguments.


- A. At the macro level, there are three major patterns.
 1. Arguments may be arranged in a series structure, in which each argument is linked to another.

Series Structure




2. Arguments may be arranged in a convergent structure, in which the entire set of arguments, taken as a whole, is linked to the resolution or claim.

Convergent Structure



3. Arguments may be arranged in a parallel structure, in which each argument independently is linked to the resolution or claim.

Parallel Structure



- B. In a convergent or parallel structure, there are additional choices to be made.
 1. One choice is whether to put the strongest arguments first or last.
 2. One choice is whether to anticipate and answer objections up front.
 3. One choice is whether to proceed from the familiar to the unfamiliar.
 4. These choices are matters of logical indifference but rhetorical significance.

- C. Independent arguments follow several common organizational patterns.
1. They can be arranged in chronological order.
 2. They can be arranged in spatial order.
 3. They can be arranged in categories.
 4. They can use a cause-effect or problem-solution structure.
 5. They can be arranged as comparisons and contrasts.
 6. They can rely on the method of residues.

Essential Reading:

Austin J. Freeley and David L. Steinberg, *Argumentation and Debate*, chapter 12.

Chaim Perelman, *The Realm of Rhetoric*, pp. 138–152.

Supplementary Reading:

Richard D. Rieke and Malcolm O. Sillars, *Argumentation and Critical Decision Making*, pp. 225–247.

J. W. Patterson and David Zarefsky, *Contemporary Debate*, pp. 59–69.

Questions to Consider:

1. In what ways do the choices discussed in this lecture reflect both creativity and constraint? How can creativity be enhanced in the face of constraint?
2. Under what circumstances might a series, convergent, or parallel structure each be the most productive and useful for an arguer?

Lecture Eighteen

Attack and Defense I

Scope: Unless the case self-evidently fails to argue for the resolution, its presentation will shift the burden of rejoinder to other parties in the dispute. This lecture considers how a case might be attacked. Despite the seeming use of a military metaphor, attacks on a case serve the cooperative purpose of reaching the best possible resolution of a controversy. Just as choices were involved in constructing the case, so are decisions to be made in planning an attack. These include which arguments to attack, at which parts of the argument to focus the attack, and what type of attack to develop. These choices often are made instinctively by skilled arguers, but they can be understood better if they are examined systematically.

Outline

- I. The dynamics of controversy involve what happens after a case is presented.
 - A. Assuming that the case is plausible on its face, its presentation obligates other arguers either to accept it or to meet the burden of rejoinder.
 - B. The burden of rejoinder is met through the interrelated processes of attack and defense, together referred to as *refutation*.
 - C. We should not be misled by the military metaphor in thinking about attack and defense.
 1. The goal of arriving at sound judgment is shared.
 2. If well conducted, attack and defense are constructive processes, and both parties benefit from the exchange.
 3. What attack and defense in argumentation do share with military campaigns is concern for strategic choices and for making them carefully.
- II. Attacking arguments involves several selection choices.
 - A. Which arguments to attack?
 1. Not every argument requires attack.
 2. Attacking every argument can involve one in tenuous positions or create internal inconsistencies.
 3. Arguments not attacked may be either ignored or granted.
 4. Deciding what to attack helps to narrow the potential issues to the actual issues.
 5. As with case construction, the strength of the attack and the relevance of the argument to the resolution should govern this decision.
 - B. Which part of the argument to attack?

1. One option is to attack the claim, by denying it outright or by countering it, for example.
 2. One option is to attack the evidence.
 3. One option is to attack the inference linking evidence and claim.
 4. One option is to attack the contextual assumptions that undergird the whole argument.
- C. What will give the most result with the least effort (applying the mini-max principle)?
- D. What type of attack to develop?
1. Asking a question is basically a holding operation that can be nullified when the answer is given, unless the question is unanswerable.
 2. Identifying internal deficiencies in the argument will show how the arguer failed to meet the burden of proof.
 3. Identifying inconsistencies among parts of the argument can cast doubt on the sincerity of the arguer, as well as requiring a response to the inconsistency.
 4. Labeling the opponent's argument strategy can identify fallacies or attempts to thwart the goal of critical reasoning and resolving disagreement.
 5. A counterargument is a denial of the claim itself, forcing the listener to choose between competing claims.
 6. Recontextualization of the argument will situate it in a broader context in which it now appears unsatisfactory.
- E. Although arguers often make these choices instinctively and in the heat of the moment, studying them systematically helps to make us aware of the range of choices and to "coach" better strategic judgments.

Essential Reading:

Austin J. Freeley and David L. Steinberg, *Argumentation and Debate*, chapter 14.

Richard D. Rieke and Malcolm O. Sillars, *Argumentation and Critical Decision Making*, pp. 225–248.

Supplementary Reading:

J. W. Patterson and David Zarefsky, *Contemporary Debate*, pp. 70–85.

Questions to Consider:

1. What skills and attitudes are necessary for the attack on an argument to achieve its constructive potential and contribute to the goals of all arguers to resolve disagreement?

2. Under what circumstances will each of the various types of attack (asking questions, identifying internal deficiencies, and so on) be the most effective choice?

Lecture Nineteen

Attack and Defense II

Scope: This lecture continues the discussion of attacking arguments by focusing on a second set of choices: those related to the arrangement and presentation of the attacks. Then the focus shifts to defense and rebuilding of arguments. The choices available to the defense are more limited. The lecture will consider the basic strategic options of the defense, then highlight the most significant selection and arrangement choices. Finally, the lecture will consider how the pattern of attacks and defenses, responses, and extensions helps to move the dispute forward by narrowing the areas of dispute and helping the arguers to find common ground.

Outline

- I. Attacking arguments involves several arrangement choices.
 - A. Should the attacks be organized in the same way as the arguments being attacked?
 1. Doing so will make it easier for audiences to follow the argument.
 2. But doing so may put the respondent on the opponent's ground.
 3. Building one's own organizational scheme around the central points in dispute may be more effective.
 - B. How completely should the attack be developed?
 1. The argument should be stated in a way that the opponent will accept.
 2. The attack should be clearly stated.
 3. The attack should be developed and supported.
 4. The significance of what the attack has accomplished should be made clear.
- II. Strategic choices regarding the defense of an argument that has been attacked are more limited.
 - A. The basic strategic options are few.
 1. One can demonstrate that the attack is inapplicable to the case.
 2. One can demonstrate that the attack is of trivial consequence.
 3. One can demonstrate that the attack is inadequately established.
 4. One can demonstrate that the attack is in error.
 5. The most basic choices, however, are made in the original presentation of the argument, taking possible attacks in mind and considering how to reduce their impact.
 - B. The selection choice is not whether to respond to the attack (for that could be fatal) but how seriously to take the attack and which of the above response strategies to use.
 - C. The arrangement choice is whether the structure of the original argument or the structure of the attack will be the dominant organizational plan.
 1. The respondent should be careful not to repeat the original argument without extending it or responding to the attack.
 2. The respondent should be careful not to let the attack "run away with" the argument so that the attack, rather than the original case, becomes the dominant focus.
- III. General methods of refutation can be used in both attack and defense.
 - A. *Reductio ad absurdum* suggests that the other arguer's position leads to unacceptable implications.
 - B. Turning the tables involves showing how a position claimed by one party actually benefits the other.
 - C. Dilemmas suggest that the opposing arguer must choose between unacceptable alternatives.
 - D. Argument from residues dictates the opponent's position by eliminating all other possibilities.
 - E. Argument *a fortiori* suggests that what is true of the lesser is true of the greater and vice versa.
 - F. Contradictions and inconsistencies eliminate at least one of the other arguer's positions, as well as questioning the other arguer's general credibility.
- IV. The processes of attack and defense together help to move the discussion forward.
 - A. Strategic choices made by the individual arguers will waive some potential issues from consideration.
 - B. Some aspects of the controversy will be settled or dropped through attack and defense.
 - C. The central issues on which the dispute turns will be identified, the positions of the arguers will be clarified, and the difference between them will be recognized.
 - D. How, in light of attack and defense, do arguments ever end?
 1. Sometimes the process of attack and defense will continue until the arguers themselves reach a mutually satisfactory resolution.
 2. Sometimes the attack and defense will leave the arguers in disagreement but will enable a third party to reach a defensible judgment.

3. Sometimes the attack and defense will carry forward what is an essentially contested or unresolvable dispute, but this too has benefits.

V. Analysis and practice of attack and defense are closely related.

- A. Analysis permits identification and evaluation of available choices and reassessment of those made by the arguers in a given situation.
- B. This sort of analytic exercise sensitizes one to both the range and the importance of strategic choices and should improve the choices one makes in a given situation.

Essential Reading:

Austin J. Freeley and David L. Steinberg, *Argumentation and Debate*, chapter 14.

Richard D. Rieke and Malcolm O. Sillars, *Argumentation and Critical Decision Making*, pp. 225–248.

Supplementary Reading:

J. W. Patterson and David Zarefsky, *Contemporary Debate*, pp. 70–85.

Questions to Consider:

1. How can one devise arguments that will take into account possible attacks and, thus, minimize the need for substantial defense later?
2. Is the military metaphor (attack and defense) the best way to describe the processes of refuting and rebuilding cases? What are its implications? Is there a better alternative characterization of these processes?

Lecture Twenty

Language and Style in Argumentation

Scope: This lecture completes a series that address the development of arguments into cases and the dynamics of controversy created by the presentation of a case. Here, the specific concern is with choices related to language and presentational style. Everyday arguments are embedded in language, and language is not a neutral instrument for conveying content. Neither is it adornment that is added on to an argument's "real" content. Rather, language is itself a factor in the argument, and how an argument is presented is part of its content. This lecture will explore how definitions, figurative language, and intensity contribute to argumentation and how they affect the presentation of a case.

Outline

- I. Language is a resource in everyday argumentation.
 - A. Arguments are cast in language and are not reducible to the formulas of formal logic.
 - B. Language is an intrinsic aspect of the argument, not something that is added for ornamentation.
 - C. Arguers make choices about language, which serves as a strategic resource.
- II. Definitions are a strategic resource for the arguer.
 - A. Definitions serve many purposes.
 1. They characterize common usage.
 2. They make vague terms more precise.
 3. They invent new usage.
 - B. Of special interest to argumentation is the persuasive definition.
 1. This is a form of slanting in which definitions are used to gain an argumentative advantage.
 2. It alters the meaning of a term by associating it with a term of clear positive or negative connotation.
 3. It transfers emotional meaning from one denotation to another.
 - C. Definitions are used in argumentation to recontextualize a claim.
 1. A term may be divided into two aspects (such as *appearance* and *reality*); this is called dissociation.
 2. The new context is then associated with the more positively valued term.
 3. This process can advance controversy by overcoming a seeming impasse in the argument.
 - D. Definitions are used in argumentation to alter the scope of the conflict.

1. The would-be loser may redefine the conflict to enlist the effort of others who previously have not been involved.
2. Sometimes, conversely, definitions may be used to restrict the scope of the argument by excluding otherwise interested parties.

III. Figures of speech, rather than being ornamentation, also have argumentative implications.

- A. They may increase the presence of a concept.
 1. This involves making it more salient, bringing it to the foreground.
 2. Presence makes the abstract concrete and evokes realities that are distant in time and space.
 3. Analogy, metaphor, and simile all function to increase presence.
 4. Other approaches to increasing presence include repetition, accumulation of details, and accent.
- B. They may suggest a choice among alternatives.
 1. The use of antithesis obviously poses a choice.
 2. Metaphors suggesting persuasive definition can be used to pose choices.
- C. They may increase communion with the audience through reference to common activities or experiences.

IV. Linguistic precision and intensity also have argumentative implications.

- A. Imprecise language is not always undesirable.
 1. It may leave options open for later consideration.
 2. It may allow parties with divergent interests to agree on a goal but to do so for different reasons.
- B. Strategies are available to make language less precise.
 1. Euphemisms can serve this purpose.
 2. Ambiguity, equivocation, and vagueness—previously examined as fallacies—can be used intentionally to achieve this purpose.
- C. Strategies are available to make language more precise.
 1. Stipulative or operational definitions can serve this purpose.
 2. Drawing analogies to other arguments can serve this purpose.
 3. Naming the argument can serve this purpose.

V. From these examples, we can conclude that language and methods of composition and presentation are not neutral.

- A. They are part of the substance of the argument, not separate from it.
- B. They affect the strategic positions and interests of the arguers.
- C. They affect the context and perspective within which arguments will be perceived.

Essential Reading:

Douglas Walton, "Persuasive Definitions and Public Policy Arguments," *Argumentation and Advocacy* (Winter 2001), pp. 117–132.

"Figures of Speech," in Thomas Sloane, ed., *Encyclopedia of Rhetoric*, pp. 309–314.

Supplementary Reading:

Chaim Perelman, *The Realm of Rhetoric*, pp. 126–137.

Richard D. Rieke and Malcolm O. Sillars, *Argumentation and Critical Decision Making*, pp. 291–305.

Charles L. Stevenson, *Ethics and Language*, chapter 8.

Questions to Consider:

1. Persuasive definition has been referred to as an argumentative strategy. Can it also be a means to prevent argument by substituting a definition for a case? How can this danger be minimized?
2. What are the similarities and differences between figures of speech and deductive argument forms with respect to enhancing presence and awareness of thoughts and ideas?

Lecture Twenty-One

Arguments between Friends

Scope: The final group of lectures will move beyond consideration of individual arguments and their organization into cases, to examine the practice of argumentation in society. The organizing principle is the concept of spheres of argument, distinctive sets of expectations that provide contexts for arguing. Drawing on the work of Thomas Goodnight, the lectures consider the personal, technical, and public spheres. After introducing the idea of spheres, this lecture will concern the personal sphere, in which dialogue is the mode of discourse and participants seek to resolve their own disagreements. The ideal of a critical discussion is proposed and coalescent argumentation is described as a way to approach the ideal. Practices that diverge from this ideal are noted and possibilities for repair are considered.

Outline

- I. In a pluralistic society, argument takes place in different spheres of activity.
 - A. This is a consequence of the absence of universal standards for argument evaluation and the resulting dependence on context.
 - B. Spheres identify accumulated expectations that provide contexts for arguing.
 - C. Spheres differ along the private/public dimension.
 1. Argument in the personal sphere is of concern only to the people involved, who also serve as the evaluators of one another's argumentation.
 2. Argument in the technical sphere is conditioned by background and expertise in particular fields and is accessible to those in the field.
 3. Argument in the public sphere is concerned with matters that affect people generally in their role as citizens; in principle, it is accessible to all.
 - D. Migration of arguments from one sphere to another is common.
 1. Formerly personal matters, such as child abuse and sexual harassment, can be recast as public concerns.
 2. Economic issues and matters of defense policy have been suggested to be technical questions that need not engage the public.
 3. Some controversies, such as the proposal for school vouchers, seek to redirect an argument from the technical to the personal sphere.
 4. On some topics, such as abortion, the heart of the dispute is whether the subject belongs in the personal or the public sphere.

- II. The personal sphere of argumentation has several dominant characteristics.
 - A. Its focus is on how people conduct and seek to resolve disagreements that concern themselves.
 - B. The primary data consist of naturally occurring talk in which overt opposition is present.
 1. Opposition exists because two or more people maintain what they take to be incompatible standpoints.
 2. Each person seeks to influence the others to accept his or her position.
 - C. Dialogue is the dominant mode of discourse.
 1. Conventions, such as taking turns, are learned through socialization and are applied instinctively.
 2. The relationship with the other person will influence what must be said and what can be left unsaid.
 3. The exchange is private and ephemeral; the outcome is preserved only in the memory of the participants.
 - D. Materials for argument are drawn from what comes readily to mind; there is no advance preparation.
- III. Ideally, argument in the personal sphere would take the form of a critical discussion.
 - A. A critical discussion proceeds in stages.
 1. Disagreements are identified.
 2. The parties agree on the means for resolving the disagreement.
 3. The merits of the competing positions are explored in as much detail as necessary.
 4. Either the disagreement is resolved or the parties recognize that no agreement is obtainable.
 - B. A critical discussion reflects normative standards.
 1. Both parties wish to resolve, not merely to settle, the disagreement.
 2. Each party has an equal opportunity to influence the other; power or prestige does not influence the outcome.
 3. Each party is willing to resolve the dispute "on the merits," without reference to other considerations.
 4. There are no artificial constraints (such as time limits or a stipulated presumption) to the resolution of the dispute.
 5. Participants share the values of sincerity, efficiency, relevance, and clarity that are embodied in the "Cooperative Principle" of H.P. Grice.
 6. Participants share commitments to nonviolence, freedom of speech, and intellectual pluralism.
 - C. A critical discussion uses coalescent argumentation.

1. Coalescent argumentation recognizes that all parties to a dispute have goals, and it tries to find a way to meet them.
 2. Coalescent argumentation uses methods and techniques that enhance commonality, truth, and agreement in a goal-directed setting.
- D. Coalescent argumentation uses a three-step procedure.
1. The positions of the dispute partners are identified.
 2. The points of commonality between positions are identified and removed from the dispute.
 3. Means are sought for maximizing satisfaction of goals not in conflict and for satisfying those that are in conflict to the degree that is reasonable.
- IV. In practice, argumentation in the personal sphere often falls short of this ideal standard.
- A. How people actually argue can be determined by observing them or by examining transcripts of their conversations.
 - B. Interaction is often devoted to ending, but not necessarily to resolving, disagreements.
 - C. People are not disinterested in the outcome but often have a heavy investment in one result or another.
 - D. People often treat certain beliefs as so fundamental that they cannot be challenged.
 - E. There often are inequalities in skill, social power, and resources available to the disputants.
 - F. Arguments are incompletely developed and often must be read "between the lines."
- V. Beyond describing the actual practice of arguers, the study of argumentation seeks to bring their practice more in line with the ideal.
- A. Argument reconstruction "fleshes out" and "formats" an argument so that it can be analyzed.
 - B. The analysis clarifies what is at issue, the competing positions, and the apparent structure of reasoning.
 - C. The analysis can be used to identify violations of norms, to assess their seriousness and consequences, and to point the way to improved argument practice.

Essential Reading:

Michael A. Gilbert, *Coalescent Argumentation*, chapters 8–9.

Frans H. van Eemeren et al., *Fundamentals of Argumentation Theory*, chapter 10.

Supplementary Reading:

"Politics: The Personal, Technical, and Public Spheres of Argument," in Thomas Sloane, ed., *Encyclopedia of Rhetoric*, pp. 629–631.

Sally Jackson and Scott Jacobs, "Structure of Conversational Argument: Pragmatic Bases for the Enthymeme," in William L. Benoit, Dale Hample, and Pamela J. Benoit, eds., *Readings in Argumentation*, pp. 681–709.

Robert Trapp, "Generic Characteristics of Argumentation in Everyday Discourse," in William L. Benoit, Dale Hample, and Pamela J. Benoit, eds., *Readings in Argumentation*, pp. 185–204.

Pamela J. Benoit and William L. Benoit, "To Argue or Not to Argue," in Robert Trapp and Janice Schuetz, eds., *Perspectives on Argumentation*, pp. 55–72.

Questions to Consider:

1. What incentives might arguers have to move a dispute from one sphere to another? How might this movement be resisted?
2. How can coalescent argumentation resolve disagreements while seeing that the positions of the arguers receive careful and rigorous testing?

Lecture Twenty-Two

Arguments among Experts

Scope: Argumentation often takes place in specialized fields that have field-specific patterns of inference or appraisal. Argument fields are sometimes defined by their subject matter (such as academic disciplines) and sometimes by their orientation or worldview (such as behaviorism or postmodernism). Drawing on examples from law, science, management, ethics, and religion, this lecture will consider how the nature of argumentation is affected by the assumptions of the field in which it takes place. The lecture will also consider interfield disputes—those in which people in different fields participate in the same controversy—and will suggest how they sometimes can proceed toward resolution.

Outline

- I. In the technical sphere, argumentation takes place in specialized fields.
 - A. Fields are defined and constituted in different ways.
 1. Sometimes they are defined by their subject matter, as in the case of academic disciplines.
 2. Sometimes they are defined by their general orientation or worldview, such as behaviorism or postmodernism.
 - B. Each field will have its own norms and conventions of argument, shared by its members and often inaccessible to others.
 - C. These norms and conventions define the context in which argumentation takes place and agreement is sought.
 - D. Placing a controversy in a certain field affects both how it will be conducted and who will be qualified to participate.
- II. Legal argument is an example of an argument field.
 - A. Fundamentally, it involves reasoning with rules.
 1. One determines “the facts,” which is the special role of the trial.
 2. One then applies the relevant rule to the facts.
 3. One then will derive a conclusion, seemingly deductively and objectively.
 - B. This simplistic view requires some complication.
 1. “The facts” may be influenced by our perception and judgment.
 2. There may be multiple relevant rules, or there may be none.
 3. The rule may be capable of multiple interpretations.
 4. The model is normative and may not be an accurate description.
 - C. Certain patterns of argument are emphasized.

1. Clearly defined standards exist for what counts as evidence.
 2. Literal analogy helps to establish similarities between the terms of the rule and the case at hand.
 3. Cause is used to structure stories and to establish responsibility for actions.
 4. Authority is used to defend warrants.
 5. *Stasis* in place considers whether a controversy belongs in the legal system.
- D. Specialized knowledge is required for legal argument.
 1. One needs to know how to determine the relevant rules.
 2. One needs to know stipulated meanings for such general concepts as burden of proof and *prima facie* case.
 3. One needs to know the procedures for inference from rules.

III. Scientific argument is an example of an argument field.

- A. The goal is to describe, explain, and predict aspects of experience.
 1. This is done to account for individual phenomena.
 2. This is also done to predict outcomes and to develop theory.
- B. “Normal science” applies and refines theory.
 1. It expands the reach of theory by showing that it covers new situations and explains anomalous cases.
 2. The method is hypothesis testing, with presumption set against the hypothesis and alternative sources of variation controlled for.
 3. Claims are factual statements about the phenomenon.
 4. The evidence is factual statements about the theory.
 5. Warrants are formulas or regularities implicit in the theory.
- C. “Revolutionary science” occurs when a fundamental paradigm for viewing things is called into question.
 1. Now the discussion is a kind of meta-argument, about theories rather than phenomena.
 2. The claim is that theory X should replace theory Y.
 3. The evidence is a demonstration that a proposed alternative theory can account for the phenomena better than the current one.
 4. The warrants are the values of theory itself, such as parsimony and explanatory power.
- D. Disputes about paradigms are settled by means other than an appeal to facts.
 1. One paradigm may be shown to subsume the other.
 2. One paradigm may be shown to fulfill common values better than the other.
 3. One paradigm may be defeated by exposing its self-contradictory nature.
 4. Paradigm disputes often take place over extended periods of time.
- E. Specialized knowledge is required for scientific argument.

1. One must be familiar with relevant theories and their specifications.
2. One must understand the design of experiments and procedures for testing hypotheses.
3. One must be able to recognize and articulate the assumptions of one's paradigm.

IV. Managerial argument is an example of an argument field.

- A. Choices must be made under severe constraints on information and time.
- B. Simplifying devices are used to guide decision making.
 1. Incrementalism is a simplifying device.
 2. Cost-benefit analysis is a simplifying device.
 3. "Satisficing" is a simplifying device.
- C. Arguments typically are about means to achieve the stated objectives or values of an organization.

V. Ethical and religious argument is an example of an argument field.

- A. The assumption is that what is right should be done, and the controversy focuses on what is right.
- B. Controversies frequently involve conflicts between values and hierarchies of values.
 1. Values can be defended in terms of other values.
 2. Values can be defended by reference to authoritative or sacred texts.
 3. Values are not defended solely by reference to their consequences.
- C. The focus of the controversy, though, may be on how we describe a given situation, because ethical or religious principles may be implicit in the description.

VI. What happens when the field to which a controversy belongs is not apparent?

- A. Examples illustrate the problem.
 1. Is nuclear defense strategy a scientific or a moral issue?
 2. Is abortion a religious question or a civil liberties question?
 3. Is foreign policy a strategic or a humanitarian matter?
- B. These questions raise issues of how a controversy should proceed and who is qualified to argue.
- C. If interfield disputes are to proceed, some means of translation must be found.
 1. "Interfield borrowing" is one option.
 2. Transforming a controversy from the technical to the larger public sphere is one option.

Essential Reading:

"Argument Fields," in Thomas Sloane, ed., *Encyclopedia of Rhetoric*, pp. 37–40.

Richard D. Rieke and Malcolm O. Sillars, *Argumentation and Critical Decision Making*, pp. 144–160, 205–223.

Supplementary Reading:

Charles Arthur Willard, "Argument Fields," in J. Robert Cox and Charles Arthur Willard, eds., *Advances in Argumentation Theory and Research*, pp. 24–77.

Edward H. Levi, *An Introduction to Legal Reasoning*.

Thomas S. Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, 2nd ed.

John Lyne, "Argument in the Human Sciences," in Robert Trapp and Janice Schuetz, eds., *Perspectives on Argumentation*, pp. 178–189.

Questions to Consider:

1. What are the implications of observing that legal and scientific reasoning both appear to be deductive but actually are not?
2. Are interfield disputes more likely to be "essentially contested" than are disputes that take place within a given field?

Lecture Twenty-Three

Public Argument and Democratic Life

Scope: The public sphere is the place for arguments that concern matters of general interest to people in their capacity as citizens. Deliberations about public policy are the province of the public sphere. Warrants are drawn from the social and political beliefs of the audience, but arguers must confront the fact that the audience is homogeneous and devise arguments that can appeal simultaneously to different political presumptions. The lecture will mention several approaches for doing so. Finally, the lecture will discuss the importance of a robust public sphere and will offer some speculations about the current state of the public sphere.

Outline

- I. Arguments in the public sphere have two key characteristics.
 - A. They are addressed to, and offered in behalf of, a general audience; therefore, they are accessible to all citizens.
 - B. They affect the community at large, not just those who are immediately present for the deliberation.
- II. A variety of forums exists for public argument.
 - A. Traditionally, these arguments were addressed to people in large public assemblies.
 - B. The public forum is an imagined space that exists whenever people have the freedom to exchange ideas and certain conditions are met.
 1. A problem affects people collectively, as well as individually.
 2. Cooperative action is needed.
 3. Information is incomplete and there is no self-evident solution so that people must exercise subjective judgment.
 4. Nevertheless, a decision is required.
 - C. In addition to such obvious venues as political campaigns and legislative bodies, the public forum may be found in locations as diverse as PTA or city council meetings, television talk shows, certain Internet discussion groups, and letters to the editor.
 - D. Traditionally, the public forum is concerned with large civic and political issues (such as war and peace, taxes, and social welfare), but these can manifest themselves very close to home.
- III. Warrants in public argument come from the audience's social and political beliefs.
 - A. Social knowledge can serve as a warrant.
 1. This is composed of normative judgments and implicit beliefs that are treated as knowledge.
 2. They often are left out of arguments because they are assumed.
 - B. Naïve theories of attribution can serve as warrants.
 1. People naturally strive for coherence in explanations.
 2. Favorable outcomes are attributed to one's own efforts; unfavorable outcomes, to factors beyond one's control.
 3. The consequence is that arguments can reinforce personal efficacy.
 - C. Naïve theories of motivation, such as conspiracy theories, can serve as warrants.
 1. Such theories explain events, even those that seemingly would disprove the conspiracy's existence.
 2. These theories coherently organize events and predict what will come next.
 3. These theories permit dismissal of an opponent's argument on the basis of tainted motive.
 - D. Each of these warrants may in practice violate normative standards for strong arguments that were established earlier.
- IV. Public argument potentially must deal with the fact that the public is heterogeneous.
 - A. For example, the public will contain elements of both liberal and conservative presumptions.
 1. The liberal presumption regards change as inevitable and believes it should be guided, regards human nature as basically good, venerates reason, and is willing to use government to promote the common good.
 2. The conservative presumption favors maintenance of existing social relations and practices, venerates tradition, believes that human nature is not necessarily good or selfless, and regards reform as often shortsighted.
 3. These beliefs coexist in the public and sometimes in the same person.
 - B. Successful public argument will draw on both the liberal and the conservative presumptions.
 1. Innovation may be portrayed as a return to tradition.
 2. Mild actions may be described in excessive rhetoric.
 3. A policy proposal may be part of a package that contains appeals to both presumptions.
 - C. In contrast, avowedly ideological argumentation usually will not succeed in the public sphere.

- V. Certain choices about the presentation of argument characterize controversy in the public sphere.
 - A. Condensation symbols and slogans achieve strategic ambiguity.
 - 1. A condensation symbol, such as the flag, "condenses" a wide range of divergent attitudes and emotions in a common symbol.
 - 2. People will endorse the symbol for different reasons, but the symbol becomes a focal point on which they unite.
 - B. Persuasive definitions play a significant role.
 - 1. The term substitutes for a careful, fully developed argument.
 - 2. Successfully applying the term to a concept or idea has the same practical effect as advancing the fully developed argument.
 - C. Linking policy proposals to ultimate terms (highly positively charged or negatively charged terms) will enhance their apparent value.
- VI. A robust public sphere is vital to democratic life.
 - A. It encourages citizen participation, civic deliberation, and discerning judgment about matters of general importance.
 - B. There are grounds for concern about the state of the contemporary public sphere.
 - 1. Increasing numbers of people claim to have little interest in public affairs.
 - 2. Many are put off by the complexity and difficulty of important public issues.
 - 3. Others are satisfied with information that oversimplifies complex issues and converts them into slogans.
 - 4. Large numbers of people think that they are powerless to effect change in the public sphere.
 - 5. There is growing distrust of politicians and other public figures.
 - C. On the other hand, there are encouraging signs.
 - 1. Many who disdain traditional politics are involved actively in their own communities on issues that affect the public good.
 - 2. New forums are emerging at the local level.
 - 3. It may be that, rather than disappearing, the public sphere is becoming localized and more diverse.
 - 4. What it means to be a citizen may be changing but not eroding.

Essential Reading:

Ralph H. Johnson, *Manifest Rationality*, chapter 1.

Trevor Parry-Giles and Shawn J. Parry-Giles, "Reassessing the State of Political Communication in the United States," *Argumentation and Advocacy* (Winter 2001), pp. 158–170.

Supplementary Reading:

Richard D. Rieke and Malcolm O. Sillars, *Argumentation and Critical Decision Making*, pp. 266–288.

David Zarefsky, *Public Speaking: Strategies for Success*, pp. 418–420.

Jürgen Habermas, *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere*.

Gerard A. Hauser, *Vernacular Voices: The Rhetoric of Publics and Public Spheres*.

Questions to Consider:

- 1. What are the major differences between the public sphere and the technical sphere? Under what circumstances might it be advantageous to locate an argument in each sphere?
- 2. What public policies and civic practices will best promote the health of the contemporary public sphere?

Lecture Twenty-Four

The Ends of Argumentation

Scope: The final lecture returns to the level of generality with which we began. It examines larger purposes served by argumentation as a process. Its principal purpose is to serve as a means of collective judgment and decision making and, hence, as an important means of governance. Argumentation also is a way of knowing, as we decide what we believe through testing of claims. And argumentation helps to achieve the goals of a democratic society by cultivating the skills of critical thinking, reflective judgment, and active participation. Even those involved in the most mundane of informal discussions contribute to these larger purposes.

Outline

- I. Argumentation, most obviously, is a means of collective judgment and decision making.
 - A. Much of human affairs is uncertain and contingent, yet decisions are required.
 - B. Argumentation justifies decisions under uncertainty.
 - 1. It subjects ideas to rigorous testing.
 - 2. Rigor is achieved through a seemingly adversarial process, although the goal is shared and the activity is fundamentally cooperative.
 - 3. The result is to ground decisions in good reasons—reasons that withstand the scrutiny of critical thinkers.
 - C. Tests of claims are successive, not final.
 - D. The outcomes of argumentation are commitments that people are willing to make and defend but also to revise if circumstances change.
- II. Argumentation also is a way of knowing.
 - A. The pragmatist philosopher Charles Peirce identified four ways of knowing.
 - 1. Tenacity is the method of chance; one sticks to the first beliefs one gets.
 - 2. Authority involves the uncritical acceptance of a prominent person's beliefs.
 - 3. *A priori* correspondence means deducing beliefs from self-evident premises.
 - 4. Verification is the method of science.
 - B. Verification has advantages over the other three methods.
 - 1. It is open to public inspection.

- 2. It can be replicated by others.
 - 3. Results are obtained by design rather than by accident.
 - C. But if verification were the only acceptable path to knowledge, then we would be unable to know about some of the topics that concern us most.
 - 1. There would be no way to know about values.
 - 2. There would be no way to know about probabilities.
 - 3. There would be no way to know about predictions.
 - 4. There would be no way to know about recommendations for action.
 - D. The alternative is to look for analogues that achieve many of the same purposes as verification and that apply to these topics.
 - E. Argumentation is such an analogue.
 - 1. There is mutual agreement on the procedures to be followed.
 - 2. The norms of candor and sincerity are shared.
 - 3. Reflective judgment is the goal.
 - 4. The knowledge that one's views may be challenged creates an incentive to search for arguments of high quality.
 - F. This view that argumentation is a way of knowing has two important corollaries.
 - 1. In the realm of the uncertain, truth is relative to the argument that is advanced for it.
 - 2. We know through interaction with others; if the self is a composite of what we know, it is developed through argumentation with others.

III. Argumentation achieves the goals of a democratic society.

- A. Aristotle was one of the earliest thinkers to identify the social function of argumentation.
 - 1. It prevents the triumph of fraud and injustice.
 - 2. It is a means to instruct audiences when scientific instruction is of no avail.
 - 3. It makes us argue out both sides of a case, thereby discovering the strength of each position.
 - 4. It is a means of self-defense.
- B. Today, argumentation is often described as a necessary instrument of a free society by cultivating a vital public sphere. A historical summary of the U.S. experience will help to make clear what that means.
- C. The eighteenth-century Enlightenment valorized reason.
 - 1. It was seen as the dominant faculty of the mind.
 - 2. Expressions of opinion were seen as the path to truth.
 - 3. Of course, who could participate in public affairs was severely limited.
- D. The gradual enlargement of the public during the nineteenth century was not accompanied by any change in the value given to reason.

1. Restrictions on voting were gradually removed.
 2. Access to education was widened.
 3. A growing emphasis was seen on grass-roots democracy and participation at the local level.
 4. The earlier commitment to the power of reason was sustained.
- E. Trust in the power of reason was shattered during the early twentieth century.
1. Social science dealt more with empirical realities than with normative claims.
 2. Freudian psychology emphasized unconscious motivation.
 3. Crowd psychology focused on how people behave differently when they are grouped together.
 4. Disillusionment following World War I fueled awareness of the power of propaganda.
- F. During the 1920s, it became fashionable to argue against the competence of public judgment. Walter Lippmann made the point that public opinion has been disastrously wrong at the critical junctures of history as a result of commitment to a false ideal of a competent citizen.
- G. More recently, scholars have suggested that it is possible to cultivate a "public philosophy" that reinstates the place of reason in civic discussion.
1. The public philosophy requires awareness of society's social knowledge.
 2. It requires advocates who are able to "stand in" for the public and speak on its behalf.
 3. Making claims on behalf of the public demands that the advocate make strong claims and defend them ably.
 4. Training in argumentation helps one to prevent weak claims from triumphing over strong ones.
 5. Argumentation legitimizes freedom of speech and, thereby, permits a free society to function.

IV. Some brief concluding observations are in order.

- A. Even the most mundane activities of argumentation participate in these larger purposes to a greater or lesser degree.
- B. Understood in this light, a "culture of argumentation" is something to be embraced rather than despised.

Essential Reading:

"Judgment," in Thomas Sloane, ed., *Encyclopedia of Rhetoric*, pp. 409–412.
 Henry W. Johnstone, Jr., *The Problem of the Self*, pp. 133–150.

Supplementary Reading:

J. W. Patterson and David Zarefsky, *Contemporary Debate*, pp. 309–325.

Douglas Ehninger, "Argument as Method: Its Nature, Its Limitations, and Its Uses," in William L. Benoit, Dale Hample, and Pamela J. Benoit, eds., *Readings in Argumentation*, pp. 145–159.

David Zarefsky, "Argument as Hypothesis Testing," in David A. Thomas and Jack P. Hart, eds., *Advanced Debate*, pp. 252–262.

Questions to Consider:

1. If argumentation is a way of knowing and truth is relative to argument, can there be any fixed principles or unchanging standards? What are the implications of answering this question either positively or negatively?
2. For argumentation to function as a democratic instrument, must the public sphere (discussed in the previous lecture) already be healthy and robust? How can training and practice in argumentation contribute to the strength of the public sphere?

Glossary

A fortiori: argument suggesting that what is true of the lesser is true of the greater, and vice versa.

Ad hominem: argument against the person; usually regarded as a fallacy if it replaces substantive argument with personal attack but sometimes an appropriate criticism of another person's character, bias, or inconsistency.

Ambiguity: a condition in which a word or phrase could be used with multiple meanings and it is not clear from the context of the argument which meaning is intended.

Amplitude: the number and range of arguments assembled to support a claim; the greater the number and diversity of arguments, the greater the amplitude.

Analogy: an inference based on resemblances; that things which are like in most respects are probably alike in the respect in question.

Antecedent: the "if" clause in an "if-then" conditional statement.

Bandwagon effect: accepting or rejecting a claim not on the basis of its merits but simply on the basis that many others are doing so.

Begging the question: assuming in an argument something that actually requires proof.

Burden of proof: the ultimate responsibility to demonstrate that a claim or resolution is probably true.

Burden of rejoinder: the responsibility to continue the argument after a plausible case has been made for or against the resolution.

Case: the structure of arguments and evidence developed to support or to oppose the resolution.

Categorical: a form of the syllogism in which statements relate categories to other categories; the relation is either inclusion or exclusion.

Cause: an inference that one factor somehow exerts influence on another; the inference not only asserts a predictable relationship between the factors but accounts for it.

Circular reasoning: repeating in the claim what is already stated in the evidence, with the result that there is no inference or progression in the argument.

Claim: the statement of fact, definition, value, or policy that an arguer asks the audience to accept.

Classification: reasoning by example in which the move is from a general statement to a specific claim.

Coalescent argumentation: argumentation in which the goal is to maximize the interests of both parties rather than to produce a winner and a loser.

Composition, fallacy of: the assumption that what is true of the part is necessarily true of the whole.

Condensation symbols: symbols, such as a national flag, that embody (or "condense") a wide range of emotions or connotations; people will share a positive or negative reaction to the symbol although they may have very different reasons for doing so.

Conditional: a form of the syllogism that begins with an "if-then" statement, either affirms or denies the "if" clause, and reaches some conclusion about the "then" clause.

Consequent: the "then" clause in an "if-then" conditional statement.

Convergent: an organizational pattern in which a group of claims, taken together, supports the resolution or in which a group of items of evidence, taken together, supports the claim.

Correlation: a measure of the predictable relationship between two factors, of the degree to which the presence of one predicts the presence of the other, or to which change in one predicts change in the other.

Credibility: the believability of a source, the product of competence, trustworthiness, good will, and dynamism as these are assessed by an audience.

Critical discussion: an interpersonal argument in which both parties want to resolve rather than merely settle the dispute, each has an equal opportunity to influence the other, both want to resolve the dispute on the merits rather than by reference to extraneous factors, and there are no artificial constraints on their ability to resolve the dispute.

Deduction: reasoning in which the claim follows necessarily and automatically from the evidence and contains no new information not present at least implicitly in the evidence.

Dialectic: a process of discovering and testing knowledge through questions and answers.

Dilemma: an argument in which one presumably is confronted with an exhaustive set of possibilities, all of which are undesirable, yet one of which must be selected.

Disjunctive: a form of the syllogism that begins with an "either-or" statement, affirms or denies one of the options, and makes a claim about the other.

Dissociation: the breaking of a previously unitary term or concept into two separate ideas, one of which is more positively valued than the other, then identifying one's own argument with the more positively valued term.

Distribution: a property of terms in a categorical syllogism; a term is distributed if the statement containing it refers to every member of the category that the term designates.

Division, fallacy of: the assumption that what is true of the whole is necessarily true of the part.

End terms: the terms in a categorical syllogism that appear in one premise as well as in the conclusion.

Equivocation: shifting the meaning or sense of a term in the course of an argument.

Essentially contested concepts: concepts that gain their meaning or significance only in opposition to other concepts.

Evidence: the statements that are offered in support of a claim.

Example: an inference that relates parts and wholes; that what is true of one is probably true of the other.

Fallacy: conventionally understood as an argument that appears to be valid but is not; sometimes used loosely to refer to any deficiency in an argument; more specifically, identifies deficiencies in form or (according to some theorists) in procedure.

False dilemma: a purported dilemma in which the alternatives are not exhaustive (there are other unmentioned possibilities) or in which they are not all undesirable.

Figurative analogy: an analogy that asserts a similarity in the relationships between things, events, places, and so on, rather than between the items themselves.

Formal reasoning: reasoning in which claims follow from evidence as a matter purely of form, so that content and context are irrelevant; often equated with deduction, mathematical reasoning, or symbolic logic.

Generalization: inference from example in which the movement is from specific evidence to a general claim.

Hasty generalization: a generalization made on the basis of an insufficient number of examples.

Heap: the argument that, because each increment of something will be of no consequence, no amount of increment can be of consequence and a "critical mass" cannot be achieved.

Induction: reasoning in which the claim follows from the evidence only with some degree of probability and in which the claim contains new information not present in the evidence.

Inference: a mental move from evidence to a claim so that one accepts the claim on the basis of the evidence.

Informal reasoning: reasoning that is not purely a matter of form; in which content and context cannot be ignored.

Issue: a question that is inherent in the resolution and vital to its success; an argument that must be established in order to establish the claim contained in the resolution.

Literal analogy: an analogy that is a direct comparison of objects, events, places, and so on, starting with the knowledge that they are basically alike and inferring that they are probably alike in the respect under consideration.

Logic: structures of reasoning, whether formal or informal; the concern is with the relationships among statements rather than the relationship between statements and audiences.

Middle term: the term in a categorical syllogism that appears in the premises but not in the conclusion.

Mini-max principle: a guideline for strategic choices in attack and defense: one should make those choices that, with minimum effort and risk, yield the maximum gain.

Narrative: an inference from the coherence of elements in a story or plot line.

Non sequitur: an argument in which the claim has no conceivable relationship to the evidence and does not follow from it.

Objective data: evidence that can be independently established or verified and that is widely agreed to.

Parallel: an organizational structure in which each claim independently establishes the resolution or each piece of evidence independently establishes the claim.

Personal sphere: the sphere of argument in which disputes concern only the participants and are resolved by them; typically, argumentation is private and ephemeral.

Persuasive definition: a definition that changes the denotation of a term while retaining the positive or negative connotation.

Phoros: the pair of terms in a figurative analogy that is better known; the relationship between them will be used to infer a similar relationship between the other two terms.

Post hoc fallacy: the assumption that, because one event followed another, the first somehow caused the second.

Presence: salience, importance, conscious awareness.

Presumption: a descriptive characteristic of the position that would prevail in the absence of argumentation; the arguer who does not hold presumption must present a case sufficiently compelling to outweigh it.

Prima facie: literally, "at first face"; a case that, on the surface, seems to satisfy the burden of proof unless something is said against it.

Proof: support for a claim; reasons to justify acceptance of a claim; not to be confused with scientific demonstration or mathematical certainty.

Public sphere: the sphere of argument that is of general interest to people in their capacity as citizens and in which everyone is eligible to participate.

Red herring: irrelevant material that may be introduced into an argument to distract or to deflect attention.

Reductio ad absurdum: method of refutation that suggests the other arguer's position leads to unacceptable implications.

Refutation: the process of criticizing, attacking, or responding to an argument; sometimes the term is also used to embrace the process of defending, rebuilding, or extending an argument after it has been attacked or criticized.

Resolution: the ultimate claim that an advocate seeks to prove or disprove; the substance of a controversy; a declarative statement that responds to the central question in a controversy.

Rhetoric: study of the ways messages influence people; the faculty of discovering the available means of persuasion in a given case.

Self-sealing: an argument that cannot be tested or falsified because its warrant accounts for all possibilities, even those that seemingly would disconfirm the claim.

Series: an organizational structure in which each claim or piece of evidence leads to the next, only at the end of the chain leading to the resolution or claim in question.

Sign: an inference from the predictable relationship between factors: the presence of one predicts the presence of the other, or change in one predicts change in the other.

Slippery slope: an argument that suggests that a seemingly trivial or inconsequential action will start an irreversible chain of events leading to catastrophe.

Social knowledge: the conventional wisdom or common judgment of a society that is acted on as if it were true.

Sphere: a metaphorical arena for argumentation in which a distinctive set of accumulated expectations defines the context and the range of persons eligible to participate.

Stasis: the focal point of a controversy; the question on which the controversy turns, the "point of rest" at which the force of an assertion is countered by the force of a denial.

Straw man: an answer to an argument that has not been advanced and that is not germane to the matter under discussion.

Syllogism: a standard structure of reasoning containing two premises and a conclusion; the premises are the evidence and the conclusion is the claim; the conclusion is derived from the premises.

Technical sphere: the sphere of argument in which controversy takes place in specialized fields, is governed by the conventions of the field, and is accessible to people in the field.

Theme: the pair of terms in a figurative analogy about which the conclusion will be drawn; the relationship between the terms in the other, more well-known, pair will be used to infer a relationship between the terms in this pair.

Topoi: literally, "places"; categories of issues that typically arise on resolutions of a given type.

Vagueness: the property of a term that is of indeterminate meaning or that has multiple meanings but the meaning intended in the argument at hand cannot be determined.

Validity: in formal reasoning, a condition in which, if the evidence is true, the claim must be true (to have true evidence and a false claim would be contradictory); in informal reasoning, a content-neutral test of the soundness or compellingness of a claim.

Warrant: an authorization or license to make the inference from evidence to claim.

Biographical Notes

Aristotle (384–322 B.C.E.). Wrote a systematic treatise on the art of rhetoric, which he defined as the faculty of discovering the available means of persuasion in a given case. Identified forms of argument and genres of appeal.

Descartes, Renè (1596–1650). Philosopher who used systematic doubt to find the basis of knowledge in self-evident statements. Cartesian logic regards only formal deduction as acceptable reasoning.

Eemeren, Frans H. van. (1946–) Professor of argumentation studies at the University of Amsterdam. One of the founders and principal proponents of the pragma-dialectical approach to argument analysis.

Farrell, Thomas B. (1947–). Professor of Communication Studies, Northwestern University. Rhetorical critic and theorist of the public sphere; contemporary interpreter of Aristotle. Introduced the concept of *social knowledge* to designate a community's storehouse of conventional wisdom that is accepted as true.

Goodnight, G. Thomas (1948–). Professor of Communication Studies, Northwestern University. Postulated controversy as the basic defining unit of argumentation; described the liberal and the conservative presumptions in argument; distinguished among the personal, technical, and public spheres of argument.

Gorgias (c. 483–c. 376 B.C.E.). Sophist who developed and taught figures of speech and stylistic variation, although not in a systematic fashion.

Grice, H. P. (1915–1988). A philosopher of language who analyzed ordinary conversations and developed normative principles for language use that are implicitly understood by the participants in a successful interchange.

Grootendorst, Rob (1943–2000). Professor of argumentation studies at the University of Amsterdam; one of the co-developers of the pragma-dialectical approach to argumentation studies.

Habermas, Jürgen (1929–). German social theorist who has described the transformation of the public sphere from its eighteenth-century ideal to an increasingly bureaucratized and technical forum.

Hamblin, Charles L. (1922–1985). Australian philosopher who challenged conventional views of fallacies by suggesting that they should be seen as units of discourse that were not fallacious in all circumstances.

Isocrates (436–338 B.C.E.). A Sophist who taught by modeling examples of outstanding practice rather than by form precept; a leading antagonist of Plato.

Lippmann, Walter (1889–1974). Journalist, theorist, and critic of politics and society. Argued in the 1920s that the public was not competent to make

judgments about policy; qualified this view during the 1950s by arguing that it was possible to cultivate a “public philosophy.”

Mill, John Stuart (1806–1873). English utilitarian philosopher; developed systems for inferring causation that are the basis for most social science research.

O'Keefe, Daniel J. (1950–) Professor of Speech Communication, University of Illinois. Called attention to two separate perspectives on argumentation, as both product (text) and process (interaction), with different methods and objectives of study for each.

Peirce, Charles Sanders (1839–1914). American pragmatist philosopher who maintained that there were four principal ways of knowing: tenacity, authority, correspondence with *a priori* beliefs, and verification (the scientific method).

Perelman, Chaim (1922–1984). Belgian philosopher of jurisprudence; together with Mme. L. Olbrechts-Tyteca, developed a system of rhetoric in which argument is the fundamental unit; introduced such concepts as presence, dissociation, and the universal audience.

Plato (c. 428–347 B.C.E.). Philosopher who attacked the Sophists and assumed that their excesses were inherent in their practice; distinguished rhetoric (concerned with appearances) from philosophy (concerned with truth).

Protagoras (c. 445 B.C.E.). Sophist who is often regarded as the “father of debate” because he taught that every question has two sides and that “man is the measure of all things.”

Ramus, Peter (1515–1572). Dutch philosopher who refigured the relationship between philosophy and rhetoric by regarding invention and arrangement as part of philosophy and logic, leaving rhetoric with only style and delivery.

Stevenson, Charles L. (1908–). Philosopher of language who introduced the concept of the persuasive definition, which transfers positive or negative connotation from one denotation to another.

Toulmin, Stephen (1922–). British philosopher who has held several academic appointments in the United States; theorized that formal logic is an inappropriate prototype for argumentation and developed a model of argument as an alternative to the syllogism.

Walton, Douglas N. (1942–). Professor of Philosophy at the University of Winnipeg. Engaged in a systematic study of the fallacies in an attempt to determine more precisely the conditions under which they may be valid arguments.

Whately, Richard (1787–1863). Archbishop of Dublin; developed a theory of presumption that he maintained applied to every existing institution on the grounds that change is not a good in itself.

Willard, Charles Arthur (1945–). Leading proponent of the view that argumentation should be seen primarily as a type of interaction in which persons maintain what they construe to be incompatible positions; has written extensively on argument fields and the need for interfield borrowing of discourse.

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Benoit, William L., Dale Hamble, and Pamela J. Benoit, eds. *Readings in Argumentation*. Berlin: Foris, 1992. An anthology containing more than thirty-five articles, originally published in scholarly journals, on different areas of argumentation.

Braet, Antoine. "The Classical Doctrine of *Status* and the Rhetorical Theory of Argumentation," *Philosophy and Rhetoric* 20 (1987), 79–93. Relates the legal concept of *stasis* (or, in Latin, *status*) to argumentation theory.

Calhoun, Craig, ed. *Habermas and the Public Sphere*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1992. An introduction to Jürgen Habermas's theories of the public sphere.

Corbett, Edward P. J., and Risa A. Eberly. *The Elements of Reasoning*, 2nd ed. Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 2000. A basic introduction to reasoning based on the concept of *stasis*.

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Farrell, Thomas B. "Knowledge, Consensus, and Rhetorical Theory." *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 62 (February 1976), 1–14. Explains the concept of *social knowledge* and explores how it functions in public discourse.

———. *Norms of Rhetorical Culture*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993. Develops a theory of society and culture grounded in respect for the practice of argumentation and rhetoric.

Fogelin, Robert J., and Walter Sinnott-Armstrong. *Understanding Arguments: An Introduction to Informal Logic*, 5th ed. Fort Worth: Harcourt Brace, 1997. Sophisticated presentation of the basic reasoning patterns of formal and informal logic and a discussion of their differences.

Freeley, Austin J., and David L. Steinberg. *Argumentation and Debate: Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making*, 10th ed. Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth, 2000. The leading textbook in argumentation and debate.

Gilbert, Michael A. *Coalescent Argumentation*. Mahwah, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum, 1997. Develops a theory of argumentation in interpersonal encounters as multi-modal and fundamentally cooperative.

Habermas, Jürgen. *Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere*, translated by Thomas Burger. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1989 (1962). Develops a theory of the weakening of the public sphere during the twentieth century.

Hauser, Gerard A. *Vernacular Voices: The Rhetoric of Publics and Public Spheres*. Columbia, S.C.: University of South Carolina Press, 1999. Argues that multiple publics can be discerned by attending to the arguments and rhetorical style of ordinary citizens.

Johnson, Ralph H. *Manifest Rationality: A Pragmatic Theory of Argument*. Mahwah, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum, 2000. Assesses the state of argumentation theory, primarily from the perspective of informal logic, and offers the construct of "manifest rationality" as a way to fill gaps in existing theory.

Johnstone, Henry W., Jr. *The Problem of the Self*. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1970. Suggests that the self is discovered only through one's willingness to risk it by engaging in critical argumentation.

Kuhn, Thomas S. *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, 2nd ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970. Distinguishes between normal and revolutionary science and maintains that discourse in the latter takes place outside the conventions of seemingly deductive normal science.

Levi, Edward H. *An Introduction to Legal Reasoning*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1949. A standard introductory volume on the nature of legal reasoning, embracing neither the ideal of formal deduction nor the contemporary critical view that law is primarily a cloak for power.

Nadeau, Ray. "Hermogenes' *On Stases*: A Translation with an Introduction and Notes," *Communication Monographs* 31 (November 1964), 361–424. Makes available in English the leading classical writing on the subject of *stasis*.

Newman, Robert P., and Dale R. Newman. *Evidence*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1969. A thorough treatment of different types of evidence and tests for evaluating evidence.

Parry-Giles, Trevor, and Shawn J. Parry-Giles. "Reassessing the State of Political Communication in the United States," *Argumentation and Advocacy* 37 (Winter 2001), 158–170. Challenges the widespread belief that the quality of American political discourse has weakened during the contemporary period.

Patterson, J. W., and David Zarefsky. *Contemporary Debate*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1983. Grounds its analysis of debate in the general study of argumentation, which is seen as a means to test hypotheses for their probable truth.

Perelman, Chaim. *The Realm of Rhetoric*, translated by William Kluback. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1982. A briefer version of the author's theory of argument developed more fully in *The New Rhetoric* (1969 [1958]).

Rieke, Richard D., and Malcolm O. Sillars. *Argumentation and Critical Decision Making*, 4th ed. New York: Longman, 1997. A leading textbook in general argumentation; relates theories and principles to the study of specific fields.

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